

EVANGELICALS AND THE REPUBLICAN PARTY:
A REINFORCING RELATIONSHIP FOR ISRAEL

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Abstract

In examining one's level of religious involvement and orthodoxy of worship, several authors have found significant correlations between levels of these variables and an attachment to political parties, particularly the Republican Party (Layman, 1997). My analysis of a 2002 ABC News/*Washington Post* poll (ICPSR, 2002) finds that the same mechanism that is indicative of partisanship also influences and reinforces evangelicals' sympathies toward Israel. While the Republican and Evangelical variables are statistically significant with respect to an elevated level of sympathy toward Israel, the interaction effect of these two variables is the most noteworthy product of this analysis. When subjects respond as being both Republican and Evangelical, the size of the coefficient is at its strongest and most significant. This finding supports the hypothesized mechanism: the evangelicals' inherent sympathy toward Israel is related to their level of religiosity and is reinforced by their membership in the Republican Party. This is due to the fact that the Republican Party also has an interest in sympathizing with the State of Israel, much like the Democratic Party. The relationship between membership in the Republican Party and evangelicalism is largely based on the previous studies of Guth and Green (1986, 1987) and Layman (1997). The mechanism implied by these scholars, and used for this analysis, is the result of the consistency of the evangelicals' conservative standing on domestic social issues and the corresponding position of the Republican Party on the same issues. This position is markedly different than the Democratic Party's stance. Therefore, this difference in parties predisposes evangelicals to the Republican Party. Rather than the result of an arbitrary decision, the Republican evangelical constituency, initially founded on domestic social issues, must be satisfied with their

party's policies toward Israel. This notion represents a level of reinforcement that is not present under other partisanship interactions.

Introduction

Various studies have established links between both denominational affiliation and salience of religion when looking at ideology, voting behavior, and issue preference. Furthermore, several articles have linked the orthodoxy of one's religious worship to partisanship. Rather than operating on the differences between denominations or religions, as previously found, this new divide operates on varying degrees of religiosity within denominations or religions. The foundations of this religiosity and religious salience are directly related to orthodoxy of worship (Layman, 1997). In the case of religious support of Israel, my analysis applies similar mechanisms to evangelicals' probabilities of sympathizing with Israel, and their use of the Republican Party as a vehicle of influence on foreign policy toward the State of Israel. Using an ABC News and *Washington Post* survey conducted in April of 2002, my analysis will examine the effects of partisanship and religiosity on a Protestants' likelihood of sympathizing with Israel (ICPSR, 2002).

Authors like Layman (1997) have shown that more focus should be placed on one's level of religiosity, rather than nominal distinctions like religion or denomination, when considering partisanship. Given that religiosity has also become such a pertinent variable in the prediction of partisanship, the literature below is used to develop a variety of mechanisms by which the partisanship of worshippers can be influenced by their religion or degree of religiosity. The goal of this essay is to examine whether the religious mechanisms recognized to influence partisanship and ideology can also affect one's stance on a specific issue. Specifically, my analysis of the 2002 ABC News/*Washington Post* poll will examine the factors and mechanisms that influence the

political outlook of evangelicals, and if they can be extended to show an effect on that population's likelihood of being sympathetic toward Israel. This analysis will examine the variety of politicizing mechanisms related to religious worship and how they may affect evangelicals' level of sympathy for Israel. It will also address the role one's partisanship plays in possibly solidifying the inherent level of sympathy found in the doctrine and increased level of worship of evangelicals.

Evidence shows that both major political parties in the United States, Democratic and Republican, espouse relatively equal and unwavering support for the state of Israel (Smith, p122). Since a more orthodox level of worship of most Christian religions correlates with Republicanism, this essay will examine the extent to which that politicization and attraction translates into stronger support for sympathetic policies toward Israel. My analysis posits that the prominence of domestic social issues among evangelicals drives them to the Republican Party. It is, therefore, not an arbitrary decision when evangelicals decide to influence the Republican Party in an attempt to further policies that are sympathetic toward Israel. One may assume, however, that this decision is random when considering the comparable levels of sympathy toward Israel that emanate from both the Democratic and Republican Parties. A closer look at other issues that drive groups to a particular party explains this confusion.

Furthermore, my analysis will explore internal dynamics that may contribute to the Republican Party's ability to reinforce the inherently sympathetic view of Israel held by evangelicals. By having a large constituency of evangelicals initially sensitized by domestic social issues, the Republican Party must be sensitive to the issue of Israel. It is

this issue that is of relatively high importance to the same evangelical constituency also driven to the party for its stance on other political issues.

The broad ranging support of both the Democratic and Republican Parties for Israel is a product of several political forces. Because the continued safety and existence of the state of Israel is significant to many religious groups, their work to maintain a friendly U.S. foreign policy is logical. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the causal factors that drive a religious organization like the evangelicals to an alliance with the Republican Party, rather than the Democratic. If both parties are proponents of a persistent and friendly relationship with Israel, the prevailing issues that have attracted more orthodox worshippers to the Republican Party need to be examined when assessing which factors drive worshippers to the Republican Party to affect policy toward Israel.

Both the role of the religion and the role of the party are mutually reinforcing and should be separately significant in influencing one's support for Israel. I hypothesize that the Republican Party will, in effect, be more sympathetic toward Israel than the Democratic Party for two reasons: to prevent its evangelical constituency from seeking out the Democratic Party as a vehicle of influence on Israeli affairs; as well as to maintain the support of this more socially conservative constituency on domestic political issues. This socially conservative constituency is one that the Democratic Party lacks because of its stance on the very same domestic issues. The resulting hypothesis states that a higher degree of religiosity, as well as self-described membership in the Republican Party, will be indicative of a higher level of sympathy toward Israel. While the Republican Party's level of rhetorical sympathy and support for Israel may seem comparable to that of the Democratic Party's, I assert that its more informal constituency maintenance rhetoric

directed at supportive evangelical groups is much more explicit and sympathetic than that of the Democratic Party's. The Democratic Party's rhetoric is, therefore, more of a general speaking point that is not readily tailored to a particular and cohesive constituency like the evangelical movement. This is expected to result in a higher degree of sympathy toward Israel among evangelical Republicans than among evangelical Democrats.

The means by which such politicization can affect the opinions of religious groups continually reverts back to the salience of one's religion in his/her life. This factor dictates the importance of both Israel and the domestic social issues that are indicative of partisanship in the first place. My analysis will take Layman's (1997) analysis a step further by reapplying the implications of orthodoxy of worship to one's sympathy toward Israel, rather than just partisanship. Such an approach has the effect of isolating the implications of different levels of religiosity, as well as membership in each political party. The dynamics surrounding the basis of this issue, U.S. support for Israel, have significant ramifications on international relations, domestic politics, and national security.

Literature Review

Doctrines and Religious Politicization

Geoffrey Layman (1997) studied the implications of religious affiliation and commitment on the ideology and partisanship of voters. In “Religion and Political Behavior in the United States”, Layman shows that a cleavage has grown between people of varying degrees of orthodox worship, supplemental to the established cleavage between different denominational affiliations and their respective traditions. Orthodoxy is presented by Layman as a matter of varying degrees of salience of religion in the lives of individual people, rather than differences in the particular denomination worshipped. Since 1980 one’s denomination has declined in importance as it relates to partisanship (Layman, 1997). Rather, measures of orthodoxy and commitment began to show a significant relationship with political behavior and partisanship (Layman, 1997).

The analyses below rest on Layman’s theoretical conceptions of ‘orthodox’, versus ‘liberal’, worshipers. ‘Orthodox’ worship, as used by Layman, refers to those people who strictly adhere to the traditional interpretations, translations, and practices of their religion. This conception must be kept separate from some more traditional uses of the term ‘orthodox.’ The ‘liberal’ versus ‘orthodox’ distinction implies that people who more strictly adhere to their religion’s doctrine hold it to be more salient in their lives. This is implicit throughout Layman’s analysis. Therefore, in the context of partisanship, the concept of ‘orthodoxy of worship’ can be viewed as a matter of both salience and level of involvement. Not addressing the implied measures of religious salience presented by Layman would cause the concepts he uses to lack clarity. This is especially true when considering the array of saliency measures presented throughout this analysis.

Layman shows that level of involvement is highly correlated with the orthodoxy of one's worship. As will be shown throughout this analysis, each measure has some connection to the salience of one's religion, otherwise known as religiosity. Level of involvement is most commonly measured by one's frequency of attendance. Often, frequency of attendance is combined with more direct measures of salience to gauge one's level of religiosity. As will be shown later, measuring the saliency of one's religion has taken many forms. While each measure attempts to gauge religiosity in a relatively indirect manner, they are often combined or seen as interchangeable. The following sections will address some of the methodological issues related to the interchangeability of measures of saliency, as well as the measures themselves. It is important to examine the nature and dynamics surrounding the three most common measures associated with studying religiosity as it relates to politicization: orthodoxy of worship, involvement/frequency of attendance, and salience (see Appendix A for comparison and characteristics).

After an evaluation of the pertinent literature, the negative aspects of each measure will show that they are less effective than the use of the evangelical distinction within the Protestant faiths. While each of the above measures is more broadly applicable than the evangelical distinction, the question of sympathy toward Israel within the Protestant population does not require such a broadly applicable measure. Furthermore, the evangelical distinction does not possess any of the subjectivity or measurement problems that I argue are present in other measures, especially when they are applied as broadly as they have been. The following literature examines some of the common applications of each of the measures.

Orthodoxy of Worship

Layman asserts that the distinction between ‘orthodox’ worship and a more relaxed adherence to the social and moral stances associated with “liberal” worship has direct implications on party choice and, in turn, policy preference. He also notes that the effects of orthodoxy may be seen more readily on issue preference than on partisanship (Layman 1997, p298). This is because the latter involves the unlikely political solidification of a party’s elites to create a more coherent platform to present to the voters (Layman 1997, p295). For this to occur, clear and consistent decisions must be made by party elites to create a defined moral and social platform that is easily understood by the average voter. Layman notes that such a clear and consistent party platform has rarely been reached. When, and if, this clarity and consistency does occur, less information must be processed when deciding which party to identify with. This ability to process information is the main means by which the public can identify with a certain party or ideology.

Single issues, on the other hand, present voters with a decision based on the assessment of far fewer variables than deciding partisanship. Layman asserts that this is why it may be more appropriate to use the orthodoxy of worship measure when examining issues, rather than parties (Layman, 1997, p.298). As the differences between measures of religiosity are developed throughout this section, an appropriate measure for distinguishing between respondents’ religiosity and their level of sympathy toward Israel will be developed within the framework of an orthodoxy measure.

With the exception of Jews (Layman 1997, p301), Orthodox worshippers (as interpreted above), tend to vote for the more conservative candidate, party, or platform

(Layman 1997, p303). Religious liberals and secularists tend toward the more liberal party choices (Green, Guth, and Frasier, 1991; Green et al, 1996; Guth and Green, 1986, 1987). This difference has grown over time, as the social distinctions and issues surrounding each party have become more defined and divisive. Layman's work does not focus on the finer mechanisms of religious socialization. However, his analysis serves to reinforce links between religious adherence and the partisanship or ideology that is most amenable to it. Several other authors pursue these links with measures other than 'orthodoxy of worship.'

In contrast to 'orthodox worship', the concept of 'liberal worship' refers to subjects who adhere less strictly to their religious doctrine and tradition. Layman finds that these liberal worshippers have a logical and inherent decrease in the saliency of their religion (Layman 1997, p289). Furthermore, Layman's characterizations of orthodox and liberal worshippers can be supplanted with a variety of terms that must also be kept clear to preserve their meaning. Confusion quickly arises when discussing 'liberal worshippers' and those who tend to vote for liberal political candidates. Regardless, strict adherents (orthodox) tend to support conservative candidates, and more moderate adherents and secularists (liberalists) tend toward the liberal end of the political spectrum. The latter also tends to embrace a more liberal social and political outlook (Hunter, 1991; Kellstedt and Green, 1993; Miller and Shanks, 1996; Layman, 1997). According to Layman, this is opposite to those of strict religious adherence and their implied high religious salience (Layman 1997, p289).

This theoretical and empirical connection made by the authors above will be applied further in this analysis to see if issue continuity between religions and political

parties can be consciously recognized, with respect to sympathy toward Israel. Layman's (1997) analysis showed a link between orthodoxy and partisanship. However, orthodox worship is often synonymous with frequency of attendance. This comes from the implicit notion that those who more strictly adhere to their respective religious doctrines hold their religion to be more important. They also attend religious services more often (Layman, 1997). While this correlation between religiosity, orthodoxy, and frequency of attendance is broadly accepted, it is important to clearly assess the relationship one's frequency of attendance has with evaluating religiosity.

Involvement and Frequency of Attendance

For one to be highly committed or involved in a religion through attendance at worship services, it logically follows that religion would have to be a highly salient part of that person's life. Each of these factors is strongly interrelated. Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege (1993, p126) assert that "...salience attributed to religion, the guidance received from religion, and a composite measure of private devotionism...all rose monotonically with the level of church involvement." This finding is a pivotal point in the theoretical development of the current measure. These notions of involvement and commitment are traditionally measured by the "frequency of attendance at corporate worship services" (Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege 1993, p125). However, there are measurement problems associated with the use of attendance within the traditions of certain religions and denominations.

With Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege's (1993) use of frequency of attendance as a measure of saliency, the authors often use the term "involvement" interchangeably with frequency of attendance. This term connotes the devotion that is implied when

discussing the one's commitment to frequently attend worship services. However, the authors note that other factors must be accounted for when discussing involvement (salience) in terms of attendance. For example, the evangelical distinction would be given too much weight if only attendance were to be used as an indicator of commitment or involvement (Wald, Kellstedt, and Legee 1993, p127). This is because the traditions of evangelical worship mandate midweek attendance, unlike most other denominations. One could argue that Evangelicals are merely adhering to tradition when attending more frequently, rather than exhibiting a characteristic indicative of higher salience or commitment. Therefore, one's religious affiliation must be accounted for to properly qualify any attendance-related saliency indicators. This act corrects for any tradition-specific factors associated with attendance, as well as showing one's affiliation with a specific and defined doctrine. For example, when Wald, Kellstedt, and Legee (1993) accounted for the religious affiliation variable there were almost as many "very religious" Catholics as Evangelical Protestants, despite a difference in their frequency of attendance. This idea is depicted in Appendix B.

Wald, Kellstedt, and Legee (1993, p127) conclude that the correct measure of salience should include frequency of attendance, religious orientation, and some direct measure of salience, if possible. This is the measure of one's religious "involvement" used throughout Wald, Kellstedt, and Legee's analysis. However, their use of this term "involvement" is problematic. Most other authors use this term to refer to the frequency of one's attendance. Wald, Kellstedt, and Legee use "involvement" to refer to a kind of umbrella term for religiosity. As noted above, involvement refers to how dedicated

someone is by implying spirituality is directly correlated with attendance, regardless of other factors.

Following the conclusion that one's tradition of worship, or orientation, must be accounted for, Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege prescribe a limit on the possible responses to the frequency of attendance variable when attempting to account for "involvement." When combining this measure with other salience or affiliation variables, there should not be a "more than weekly" response option. "Weekly" should be the choice indicating the highest possible frequency of attendance at corporate worship services (Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege 1993, p135). When one's religion or denomination is accounted for along with this measure, undue weight is not given to evangelicals because of their religious traditions (Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege 1993, p127). While this methodological adjustment does correct for some problems in the measure it does not satisfy the problem associated with correlating religiosity with attendance alone. This measure of attendance has no means of gauging whether or not a respondent is merely attending worship services frequently because of family tradition. More directly, the respondent could merely be going through the motions. Finally, Layman and Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege often refer to a direct survey question to measure salience. Use of this direct salience measure, however, is also problematic and worth examining.

Salience

A more direct survey measure of one's religiosity is often combined with other measures to create a more accurate one. For example, a survey question that asks, "How important is your religion to you?" can be combined with attendance and religious affiliation to create a measure of religiosity. This approach, however, encounters one

serious problem. A respondent's assessment of the saliency of his or her own religion is highly subjective. A situation can easily be imagined where "very important" does not mean the same thing to different respondents. Being that measures like frequency of attendance are highly correlated with religiosity and salience, the use of a direct question about religious importance has become pointless.

As the sections above have shown, each of the measures discussed (orthodoxy of worship, frequency of attendance, and a direct salience survey question) has faults that are largely related to their application within analyses. My use of the evangelical distinction as a measure of religiosity applied to one's likelihood of sympathizing with Israel solves many of the methodological problems associated with the measures above. First, the evangelical distinction is not as subjective as a survey question asking about one's salience of religion. Secondly, this distinction is not applied to a broad population that cuts across quite different religious traditions and denominations. Rather, the evangelical distinction serves to segregate mainstream Protestants from Protestants with a higher degree of religiosity, i.e. evangelicals. While my analysis of the 2002 ABC News/*Washington Post* poll shows that evangelicals attend church more often than other Protestants, the most significant contribution of this measure comes from the actual meaning and tradition that accompanies an evangelical form of worship. The following section gives a more synthesized view of all of the measures discussed, while placing this analysis' evangelical measure in context.

The Measures in Context

Those with elevated levels of religiosity in their lives tend to support and identify with more conservative political actors (Layman, 1997). This theoretical connection

between high saliency, strict adherence, and a tendency towards the political right comes from the general idea that if one holds their religion to be more important in their lives they are more likely to follow its doctrine more closely. It also follows that the platform of a like-minded party is much more likely to gain those religious worshippers' support. The doctrines of most religions examined by Layman (1997) are in accordance with the moral, social, and political stances of the more conservative Republican Party. Therefore, it is logical that the alliance between stricter, more orthodox, worshippers and the Republican Party is based on a broad range of domestic social issues.

One article appeared in major newspapers noting the probable importance of religion in the 2004 presidential election (*USA Today*, 2004). This article references the work of Green and Guth (1986, 1987), and draws on many of the findings of Wald, Kellstedt, and Legee (1993). The article shows that the variable most indicative of how one will vote in the 2004 presidential election is one's frequency of attendance. The voters who attend more frequently will vote Republican, while those who attend less frequently will more likely vote for the Democratic candidate. These findings are in no way controversial when considering the analyses above. However, it is important to note that both Green and Guth interchangeably use different measures of religiosity in this article.

Even in the relatively brief *USA Today* article, frequency of attendance is often supplanted with whether or not one is an evangelical Protestant or an Orthodox Jew. The scholars referenced seem to be relying on the known link between orthodoxy of worship, involvement, and religiosity. Implied in the interchangeability of these measures is the idea that tradition or religion-specific factors do tend to be indicative of elevated salience

or religiosity. This supports the common view that frequency of attendance and some nominal denominational distinctions can often be used to effectively measure ones religiosity. The correlation between these factors is so high that these authors seem to have found them to be synonymous, and they often used them interchangeably when making such generalizations.

If respondents label themselves as evangelical, the authors in the *USA Today* article imply that there is some factor that has driven the respondents to label themselves as an evangelical Protestant, and not just a Protestant. As my hypothesis states, the very nature of the evangelical distinction connotes a higher frequency of attendance. This is arguably due, however, to that faith's traditions. More importantly, however, the evangelical distinction seems to connote a relatively higher degree of salience when compared to non-evangelical Protestants (USA Today, 2004). The nature of this evangelical distinction without the complications of frequency of attendance will be examined in a more comprehensive manner below.

After establishing that the degree of religious saliency in one's life has a strong bearing over such choices as party identification, one must question the role that the church plays in the conceptualization of political issues. The remainder of this analysis more directly examines the overt and latent mechanisms by which the correlation between politics and religiosity is made possible. As noted above, the roles of the church and its worshippers are pivotal in this process. It is unlikely that the initial connections made between the church and the Republican Party were purely the result of isolated individuals coming to their own conclusion after careful consideration and research. The

interaction between a religion and its worshippers involves many mechanisms operating to actively influence partisanship or issue preference.

In Layman (1997), the subjects were able to find a political party or issue position that most closely approximated their views; views based largely on their respective religious doctrine. This is the very mechanism that has created the religiosity-based correlation used throughout this analysis. The role of the religious organization, the community of worshippers, and its leadership will become quite apparent and central to the theory at hand. The broad nature of ideologies and parties makes the effects of religion seem quite limited when considering the possible presence of other confounding factors. However, political connections by worshippers are more readily made when considering single issues, as opposed to entire party platforms (Layman, 1997 p298). This means that religious mechanisms cannot be the deciding factor in every decision made by a devout worshipper. This analysis does assert, on the other hand, that an issue central to one's faith and political beliefs is more significantly affected by religious mechanisms. The significance of Israel to Protestants, and especially evangelical Protestants, is an ideal context within which to test the effects of elevated religiosity and partisanship on one's likelihood of sympathizing with Israel.

This analysis seeks to explore the possibility of a linkage that is analogous to the one made between one's level of adherence to the content of a religious body's doctrine and a political party's stances on domestic social issues. The question is whether or not sufficient mechanisms exist within the religious community to sensitize, mobilize, and politicize a specific population of worshippers toward an issue. While several factors influence such decisions, when the discussion is narrowed to more focused issues, the

possible ideas and mechanisms involved become clearer. Even with a narrower conception of influence and support, this analysis must next specify the mechanisms and measures that constitute the analogous application of orthodoxy, attendance, and partisanship that has been examined to this point.

Within a population of Protestants, the distinction between evangelical Protestants and mainline Protestants satisfies many of the above-established criteria for an accurate measure of the religiosity's effects on sympathy toward Israel. First, examining an issue that cuts across denominations and specific faiths would relegate a researcher to use the more subjective salience measure that is derived from survey questions. This is because not all denominations, or religions, have as commonly accepted beliefs as those shared between evangelicals and mainstream Protestants. Therefore, more than one measure of religiosity would have to be used in the same analysis. Secondly, using the evangelical distinction within the Protestant denomination does not rely solely on attendance's correlation with devotion. Rather, it relies on a relatively less subjective assessment of one's own nominal distinction as it relates to devotion and the concept of being an evangelical. Finally, Israel's relevance to the Protestant faith and the evangelical movement makes this particular analysis of religiosity quite appropriate. Given another issue, a broader assessment of religiosity's manifestations may be warranted. However, another appropriate measure would need to be developed.

Religions' Mechanisms for Sensitizing, Mobilizing, and Politicizing

The literature cited above has established mechanisms by which the moral and social underpinnings of a religion have been compared and attached to the political stances of a particular party, ideology, or issue. The analogous attachment of a religious

doctrine to the issue of sympathy toward Israel will reapply the same mechanisms, and will more clearly elucidate the overall effect of religion on issue preference. Once a doctrine is solidly linked to an issue position, the next variable is the ability of a religion to make supporters of that issue out of its worshippers. Success largely depends on how much one refers and defers to his/her religion on such decisions, i.e. how salient that religion is to them. If a worshipper holds the opinion and position of the church in low regard, he or she is unlikely to defer to it. This also works in the opposite direction. There are, however, several means by which doctrine of a religion can be transmitted to the worshipper and subsequently linked to political issues.

A closer look at the mechanisms central to a religion's ability to politicize and influence can be divided into three important realms of religious participation: 'communal', 'associational', and 'orientational' (Wald, Kellstedt, and Legee 1993, p124). These mechanisms are intimately linked to the processing of information by worshippers, and what effect that information has on their beliefs. One's religion and denomination are referred to as an 'Orientation.' This was noted above as being an integral part of the involvement measure, along with frequency of attendance. Communalism can be described as the "commonality of religious identification among family and friends" (Wald, Kellstedt, and Legee 1993, p125). This realm captures the socially constructed and reinforced aspect of religious adherence.

Finally, associationalism is "equated with public involvement in corporate religious organizations" (Wald, Kellstedt, and Legee 1993, p125). This concept has been used in several measures of religiosity. It is most often measured by frequency of attendance at collective worship along with other church-sponsored activities that

facilitate worship (Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege 1993, p124). Being that orientationalism is most amenable to the nominative response of belonging to one religion or denomination, Wald Kellstedt, and Leege (1993) found that the traditions specific to these responses must be accounted for (see Fig.1) to negate any effects originating from a particular religious tradition. Associationalism and communalism both illustrate the mechanism by which a religion's doctrine manifests in the life and beliefs of an individual worshipper or body of worshippers.

Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege demonstrate the communalist and multidimensional view of religion by showing its effects on Catholic worshippers. The following example deals with the occasional conflicts of communalism and associationalism:

...For Catholics, communal involvement correlated with commitment to the Democratic Party, but associationalism bred Republicanism, an anomaly...traced to the different political priorities of the Catholic community and its hierarchy. The former [community], viewing politics as an arena to pursue class and status interests, regarded the Democrats as most representative of their views, while the church as church regarded the Republicans as the most faithful standard-bearers of conservative personal morality. The two different forms of Catholicism, the community and the church, provided conflicting cues that translated into different partisan commitments (Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege, 1993).

It follows, theoretically, that the specific issue being examined plays an important role in determining which aspect of religion will reinforce which beliefs. While these conflicting mechanisms do not exist for every issue, they are factors that must be evaluated. Furthermore, the relative importance of each of these realms in the lives of worshippers indicates the means by which religions influence worshippers. For the purposes of this paper, there is no foreseeable negative effect associated with the communal aspect within the issue of likely sympathy toward Israel. Contrary to the

Catholicism example given above, there are no apparent theoretical disjoints between the communal and associational aspects of the issue at hand.

The example of Catholicism involved two separate issues at conflict: equality and personal morality. Within the issue of sympathy toward Israel, mostly derived from the associational aspect, there does not appear to be a communalistic tension. The context is much narrower than the party affiliation issue addressed in the Catholicism example above. In conclusion, awareness of the three factors of religious influence is necessary for valid conclusions of influence to be drawn. They are inextricably linked to the issue at hand and must be consciously addressed. With respect to a broader assessment of influence within religious bodies, it is the religious community that makes the connections between the values, or agendas, of each religious body and its respective political agenda.

This connection between beliefs and issues involves both the pulpit and social interaction with fellow parishioners (Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege, 1993; Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988, 1990). These connections and influences of the pulpit and fellow worshippers will vary with the saliency of religion in each person's life. Referring to the theoretical connection above, Layman states succinctly, "The impact of religious beliefs and affiliations on political behavior is greater for those individuals for whom religion is more salient or who are more involved in their churches than for those individuals who are less committed" (Layman, 1997 drawing on Kellstedt, 1989; Kellstedt and Green, 1993; Miller and Shanks, 1996). Saliency and its related indicators are a pivotal aspect of this paper and its assumption of influence. Concurrently, the development of the evangelical distinction within the Protestant faith is the measure of religiosity for this

analysis and its attempt to measure the likelihood of a respondent to sympathize with Israel.

Summary of Mechanisms and Measurement

This paper has established two interrelated mechanisms by which the position of a religion on a certain issue is transferred to and followed by its worshippers. One of the most important measures of religiosity is a function of the level of one's religious involvement. When a person is more involved in their religion, shown through an elevated level of devotion or frequency of attendance, that person's religion is likely to be a more prominent factor in that person's life. That same individual is more likely to ascribe to the political and social beliefs that most closely approximate their religion's doctrine. Layman (1997) has been one of the primary scholars to show that such adherence to religious doctrine is highly predictive of membership in the Republican. This calculation is actively made by the follower, but is influenced by the actions of the religious leaders. Several aspects of religious involvement reinforce this politicization, mobilization, and socialization.

A person is highly involved with his or her respective religion because that part of his or her life is relatively important to them. Therefore, one would value their religion's position on political issues for the same reason their religion is important to them in the first place. Adherence to the political tendencies most applicable to a strict interpretation of a religious doctrine is clearly a function of the role and prominence religion has in one's life. Scholars, like Layman (1997), have also shown that religiosity significantly influences one's partisanship or ideology through the same relationship mechanism of adherence and influence. This mechanism will be applied to the analysis of religiosity

and one's likelihood of holding a sympathetic view toward Israel. Partisanship will also be analyzed to show any interacting effects it might have with religiosity when attempting to predict the probability holding a sympathetic view toward Israel.

The previous discussion of religious mechanisms does not purport to describe an exhaustive list of pressures faced by a voter. It does, however, account for a body of noteworthy mechanisms that have significant effects on how religious groups possibly influence worshippers' views on specific issues. Regardless of the possible measures used, the more involved a person is in their religion (frequency of attendance used by authors) the more salient it is to them (Wald Kellstedt, and Legee, 1993). This salience translates into stricter adherence to the doctrine and teachings of that religion. For reasons specific to the difference between mainline and evangelical Protestants, this distinction will be used as this analysis' measure of religious salience or involvement.

As noted above, if the teachings of a particular denomination reflect a certain issue position, the more "involved" person will be more likely to take that stance. This is because that issue position has been deemed to be most consistent with the doctrine that is so important in that person's life. Hence, this level of religiosity is a valid reflection of one's likelihood to more consciously hold opinions that are consistent with, and most likely originate from, their religious involvement. Wald, Kellstedt, and Legee (1993) label this mechanism 'associationalism.' This elevated level of association should result in a higher likelihood of sympathy toward Israel among evangelical Protestants, as opposed to mainline Protestants. This, however, can only occur after the prominence of Israel within the Protestant faith is firmly established, and the evangelical distinction is validated as a measure of elevated religiosity.

Finally, to use the idea of a doctrine being consistent with issue positions of a religious body, one must be conscious of the contents of each religious doctrine. Assuring continuity between the doctrine of a particular religion and the issue position that one claims to have been passed on by that religion is the only way to be logically and theoretically consistent. For example, one could not logically argue that the pro-choice stance of a respondent was the direct result of a strict adherence to the teachings of the Catholic Church. This is because the pro-life stance of the Catholic Church is in direct contradiction to any influence mechanism that rests on involvement. Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege (1993) call these pertinent doctrinal distinctions “orientations.” They not only speak to the specific content of the doctrine, but to the traditions of worship that have direct implications on proposed measures of saliency. These factors of orientation must be considered before addressing any mechanism of influence.

Once the substance of a doctrine is deemed to be consistent with an issue position held by a strictly adhering follower, and there are no communalistic tensions, the mechanisms related to involvement, associationalism, and salience are more clearly operable. While there is no indicator to demonstrate the relative importance of other factors like education or family values, the defined nature of a particular issue does narrow the scope of possible outside factors being higher on a list of possible factors of influence. Therefore, one could assume that there is less competition for the deference of the worshipper. Religion takes on a more prominent role.

Several factors could possibly enhance tendencies to defer to religious doctrine or teachings. Because of its proven influence on partisanship, this analysis focuses on the salience of religion, rather than other possible factors. The salience of one’s religion

shows itself in levels of involvement, attendance, denominations, and responses to saliency questions. To develop a theory of influence by a religion toward a certain position on an issue, one must account for the doctrine and the agenda of those behind the pulpit. Evidence of evangelical and devout Protestants' support for Israel must be clear. It is because of this evidence that the sample population of respondents within the 2002 ABC News/*Washington Post* survey has been chosen to show the hypothesized politicizing mechanisms with respect to sympathy toward Israel (ICPSR, 2002). Linkages between worshippers, religious leaders, and political issues must be established for the present theory of influence to come full course. Establishing a mechanism of influence by a religious body or political party is problematic if one cannot establish the substance of what is being transmitted.

Religion and Support for Israel

To test the existence of the above-hypothesized mechanisms of religious influence, opinions of Israel within the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict will be analyzed. There are a variety of logical means by which one could come to support Israel. This is also true for the Palestinian and Arab side of the conflict. However, in keeping with the initial doctrinal linkage established by Layman when examining the ideology of orthodox worshippers, this analysis rests on the continuity between the religious doctrine and support for Israel, as opposed to partisanship. Use of the evangelical distinction as a measure of salience must be clarified, because it relates to many of the measurements and mechanisms of involvement and salience presented above.

The few characteristics that differ between mainline Protestants and evangelical Protestants gain relevance when analyzing the level of religiosity among each population. One of these distinctions rests on the literal interpretation of the Bible, as opposed to an interpretation held and espoused by religious hierarchy, church elites, or other charismatic elites. The distinction between evangelicals and other Protestants has endured a number of changes throughout the last couple of centuries. This is partially because the concept of ‘evangelicalism’ has also fluctuated in recent history. The current usage of the term ‘evangelical’ rests largely on the preservation of the divine authority of the Bible (Marsden, 1991).

The evangelical movement, made up of many subgroups, places great importance on this “literal exposition” of the Bible (Marsden, 1991). Subgroups of the evangelical movement, however, have focused on the adherence to the written word with varying degrees of militancy. George W. Dollar notes that fundamentalist evangelicals, the largest subgroup of the evangelical movement, distinguish themselves from other evangelicals by their willingness to defend a literal interpretation of the Bible with militant actions (Marsden, p24). Regardless of this fundamentalist subgroup’s militant fervor, the overarching characteristic present among all evangelical Protestants is a literal interpretation of, and adherence to the Bible. Dollar goes on to note that much of the evangelical population equates “this literal interpretation of the Bible with belief of the Bible itself” (Marsden, p25).

Each author who contributed to Dayton and Johnston’s (1991) analysis of American evangelicalism seems to agree implicitly on a literal interpretation of the Bible as a characteristic specific to all evangelicals, as opposed to mainstream Protestants.

Despite the in-depth analysis presented by each of the authors, there is confusion and dissent with respect to other distinctions between evangelicals and mainstream Protestants. Only Dayton's closing note highlights the extreme differences between evangelical and mainstream worshippers (Dayton, p249). Regardless of this acknowledgement, Dayton fails to explicitly define a second characteristic that differentiates the population of evangelical movements from the body of mainstream movements, besides evangelicals' adherence to a literal interpretation of the Bible. Without naming a characteristic that makes these two populations so distinct, Dayton asserts that they are, indeed, quite different (Dayton, p247). I assert that it is the implied difference in one's level of devotion, and its relationship with the ability to strictly adhere to the teachings of the Bible, that draws much of the line between evangelical and mainstream Protestants.

This higher level of devotion, commonly found among evangelicals, is manifested in the discipline needed to adhere to a literal interpretation and worship of the Bible. Connecting a literal interpretation and the divine authority of the Bible with a higher level of religiosity is the first step in the creation of a theoretical distinction between evangelical and mainstream Protestants, especially when using this distinction as a measure of religiosity. First, this distinction implies that an evangelical form of worship requires a greater amount of devotion to adhere to religious tenets in such a strict manner. This difference between mainstream Protestants and evangelical Protestants is the basis of the religiosity measure used for this analysis.

The pursuit of a literal form of worship connotes that evangelicals not only adhere to a dispensationalist view of world events, but that they must also attempt to live a

virtuous life that strictly abides by the tenets set forth in the Bible. Evangelical leader John Rice describes this lifestyle and form of worship as a focus on “the sole authority of the Bible, and a separated life of holiness marked by avoidance of notorious bar-room vices” (Marsden, p23). The idea that no intermediary exists between a worshipper and the writing of the Bible allows for this more direct, and literal, interpretation of eschatological, dispensational, and moral underpinnings of the Protestant faith. This form of worship represents an intimacy with the written word of the Bible without the intermediaries found in other denominations like Catholicism.

Once a literal and strict interpretation of the Bible’s dispensational, eschatological, and lifestyle provisos can be equated to evangelicals’ higher level of devotion, the content of this worship then becomes pertinent to the analysis. If evangelicals and mainstream Protestants are different in this way, the substance of what is being adhered to in different degrees becomes quite pertinent. The Biblical basis of living a life of ‘holiness’ needs little evidence for a reader to understand that a more devoted, and strictly adhering, worshipper would more likely follow such a lifestyle. Therefore, to show that more devoted and religious evangelicals would tend to sympathize with Israel more often, some significance of the State of Israel must be shown in the Bible. This is important, being that evangelicals hold the Bible in a more literal, and authoritative, regard than mainstream Protestants.

John Richard Neuhaus’ analysis of Biblical prophecy in “What the Fundamentalists Want” shows the importance of Israel to the evangelical movement’s view of things to come (Neuhaus, 1987). Evangelicals’ focus on the dispensationalist factors of Biblical prophecy places much focus on the role of Israel in the second coming

of the messiah. Neuhaus plainly states, “Jews are critical to the final act” (Neuhaus, p14). This statement is later clarified to be referring to the Jewish state of Israel. Citing Romans 9 through 11, Neuhaus notes that most evangelicals believe that the covenant between God and the people of Israel implies “that the nation that blesses the Jews will be blessed and the nation that curses them will be cursed” (Neuhaus, p15). The “precise blueprint and timetable for the return” of Jesus is a fundamental part of belief system of devout evangelicals (Neuhaus, p14). While most orthodox Christians believe in these events, Neuhaus emphasizes their importance to evangelicals’ view of the future and their faith.

The idea of evangelical groups taking such a vigorous stance in their support of Israel means that one must, again, examine the nature of the term “evangelism” itself to gain an appreciation of their literal adherence to the written word of the Bible. As the above analyses of scholars have shown, evangelicals distinguish themselves from other Protestants based on how strictly they follow the content of the Bible. *Webster’s Revised and Unabridged Dictionary* defines the term “evangelical” as “pertaining to the strict adherence to or interpretation of the gospel and the related teachings of the Christian doctrine” (Webster’s, 1998). Along with this description of the distinction between evangelicals and mainstream Protestants, there are references to Israel throughout the communications of evangelical clerics and other religious leaders.

When examining evangelical Protestants and their tendency to support Israel, the actions and statements of religious leaders and other figureheads are a useful source of anecdotal evidence. Several authors have examined biblical references and their consistency with moral issues and candidate characteristics. While evidence of the

significance of Israel to the Protestant faiths, especially the evangelical movement, is substantial, a look at the practical and political application of this idea is most clearly found by examining the actions and statements of religious leaders. This is especially true for the evangelical Christian right's support for Israel and the Israel lobby.

Anthony Smith, in *Foreign Attachments*, gives an in-depth look at some of the proactive and explicit acts of support that have been directed toward Israel by evangelical Protestant leaders. To begin with, he describes one instance in 1998 when Jerry Falwell and other members of the Southern Baptist convention expressed their willingness to support the cause of the Israeli people and their representatives to Prime Minister Netanyahu. What they proposed reflects the type of influence coming from the pulpit that Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege (1993) described. Falwell vowed "some 200,000 evangelical pastors would 'go to the pulpits and use their influence in support of the state of Israel and the Prime Minister'" (Smith, p120). Falwell dubbed this concerted effort the "Call for a United Jerusalem." Smith spends much of his analysis addressing the fact that these coalitions developed for support are not rare. In fact, they occur between varieties of groups that happen to agree on the issue of sympathy toward Israel. Regardless of the interest group, none has reached the scale and effectiveness of the pro-Israel lobbies (Smith, p120).

Next to American Jews, conservative Christian groups are the strongest supporters of Zionism and the State of Israel (Smith, 120). Many of these conservative groups with which this analysis is concerned are strongly rooted in evangelical tenets. As many of the authors above have noted, a tendency toward a stricter, more orthodox, worship among Protestant Christians is highly correlated with evangelicalism. An

established characteristic of these conservative Christian groups is that they also tend to vote Republican, as opposed to the Jewish population's tendency to vote for the Democratic candidate (Layman, 1997 and Smith, 120). The ability of these two groups to come together on this topic shows some similarity between their beliefs and the bases of their faiths.

A tension has existed between the Jewish American community and the evangelical Christian community because of moral and social issues that surround the parties typically supported by each group. Smith (2001) shows that the Jewish population in the United States has been less strict with its support for domestic social issues that are consistent with a more conservative view of the evangelical doctrine. Rather, they have voted Democratic when the issue of support for Israel was better facilitated by such an action. Regardless of this factor, American Jews tend to support Israel for obvious reasons. Furthermore, evangelical Christian groups support Israel because of the substance of its doctrine and its relevance to the future of the state of Israel. Smith addresses these biblical factors by saying:

...Conservative Christian Zionism is far from a recent creation and draws support from the chiliastic¹ Christian beliefs in Armageddon and the Second Coming of Jesus, prophecies that can only be realized following the return of the Jewish people to Israel (Smith, 120).

For many, the significance of the existence of the Jewish State cannot be understated. Its role in the Second Coming, Armageddon, and the Rapture is important to a number of Christians. The importance of this factor aside, much of the support coming from evangelicals is logical and easily empathized with. Support and sympathy for

¹ This term refers to the Christian belief that a period of peace will persist for a thousand years coinciding with the prominence of the Jewish people and the reign of Jesus. *Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary*

Israeli Jews with common beliefs or similar circumstances facing them pervades every social setting. These factors, among many others, present sufficient justification for the active support of Israel by many evangelical religious leaders. It is in the interest of Protestants and Jews that Israel remains a secure and viable state.

Much of the mechanisms of politicization described by Layman and Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege (1993) operate on one's level of adherence to religious doctrine. It is clear that much of the very nature of being an evangelical Christian implies this adherence. However, several authors (Layman, 1997; Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege, 1993) note in their analyses that adherence may not merely be a function of denomination or affiliation. Rather, they seem to assert that it is a product of salience and involvement. An analysis of simple crosstabs performed on the 2002 ABC News/*Washington Post* dataset resulted in significantly different levels of likely sympathy toward Israel among mainline Protestants and evangelicals who attend church services "at least once a week." Given the level of significance attributed to the evangelical distinction by authors like Green and Guth (1987) and Layman (1997), frequency of attendance alone does not seem to capture one's religiosity as it relates to frequency of attendance (i.e. involvement). As Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege (1993) noted in their analysis, frequency of attendance could merely be measuring attendance, rather than one's level of devotion (see Fig. 1).

There is a clearer difference in the level of sympathy for Israel when using a measure that rests purely orientational and associational factors, without the confusion presented by frequency of attendance. Especially within the issue of sympathy toward Israel, this analysis argues that when the evangelical distinction is juxtaposed with mainstream Protestantism, saliency of religion is more clearly measured. My analysis

contends that the nature of evangelical worship means that a strong majority of devout and frequently attending mainline Protestants pursue an evangelical form of worship, and that they would label themselves as such. In the absence of a dataset that contains each of the measures discussed (frequency of attendance, evangelicalism, and salience), as well as questions pertaining to Israel, the evangelical distinction within a population of Protestants is the most valid approach to measuring one's religiosity.

If proper measurements were to be included in survey data, the implications of the mechanisms described above could perhaps be seen more clearly with respect to support for Israel. The robustness of each measure could, therefore, be more accurately evaluated. Despite this data preference, a direct measure of salience is rarely accompanied in a data set by a survey question assessing whether or not one is a "born again evangelical." For the purposes of this analysis, the self-coded evangelical distinction will be juxtaposed with mainstream Protestants as a measure of religiosity within the Protestant faith.

Methodology and Analysis

There are several factors central to an assessment of sympathy for Israel in the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Along with religiosity and religious involvement, self-proclaimed membership and identification with the Republican Party is hypothesized in this analysis to reinforce preexisting sympathy toward Israel that is based in the religiosity factor. To capture the effects of being an evangelical protestant, as well as being Republican, logistical regression was chosen for its ability to calculate the interaction effects of these variables while comparing to instances where their presence is lacking. Using an ABC News and *Washington Post* survey conducted in April of 2002, my analysis will examine the effects of partisanship and religiosity on Protestants' likelihood of sympathizing with Israel (ICPSR, 2002). While partisanship is commonly found in surveys, the use of the evangelical distinction to differentiate between Protestants of varying degrees of religiosity made this dataset particularly appropriate.

To accurately assess the effects of elevated religiosity, evangelicalism, Protestant respondents and Evangelical Protestant respondents are coded accordingly with dummy variables. Only those denominations fitting the definition of a Protestant faith are coded "1" for Protestant and "0" for lack of Protestantism. Also, those respondents who state they are an evangelical Protestant are coded "1" on a separate dummy variable that accounts for the presence of evangelicalism. To ensure the accuracy of this variable, only those respondents who were initially coded as Protestant in the first variable are allowed to respond as being evangelical Protestants. This is to ensure that the evangelical variable is, in fact, a measure of religiosity with respect to only the Protestant faith.

A relatively small number of Catholic, Muslim, and Jewish respondents stated that they were evangelical Protestants. They were, therefore, deleted from the analysis to maintain the integrity of the evangelical distinction as a measure of religiosity among Protestants. Given the concept of evangelicalism that is developed and addressed in the analysis of the literature above, the coding of this dataset required that agnostics and atheists be guarded against responding as being evangelical in the same way as Catholics and Muslims in the dataset. While the frequency of such occurrences is quite infrequent, such manipulations of the data require noting. The boundaries of evangelicalism, when acting as a measure of religiosity, need not address the many nuances developed in the previous sections dealing with different movements or subsets within the evangelical faith. Using aspects inherent to the evangelical belief and worship structure suffices to differentiate that population from mainline Protestants.

An analysis of multiple cross-tabulations created the predicted probabilities for the partisanship and religion variable, before the inclusion of interaction effects between the two. The significance of the State of Israel within the Protestant faith, regardless of the presence of evangelicalism as a measure of heightened religiosity, should lead to a higher probability of sympathy toward Israel for Protestants than Catholics. The interaction of Catholicism with the partisanship variables should, therefore, show a persisting lack of any elevation in the probability of sympathizing with Israel, as compared to the same interactions with partisanship. Being that no measure of religiosity is applied to the Catholic population in this sample, their comparison with mainstream Protestants is uneven. Being that evangelicalism is the measure of an elevated level of religiosity for the purposes of this analysis, the Protestant population largely consists of

the Protestants that possess a lesser degree of religiosity. The Catholic population consists of both. The results of this comparison will likely persist through the inclusion of interaction effects with measures of partisanship.

The presence of the evangelical variable is the measure of elevated religiosity in this analysis. This measure should be especially effective when juxtaposed with a mainline Protestant variable that excludes evangelical Protestants. The orientational threshold is one factor that separates these respondents in religiosity terms from non-evangelical Protestants. Furthermore, the involvement and attendance measures of religiosity are met by the evangelical distinction. A statistically significant larger portion of Evangelicals in this dataset attends religious services at least once a week than do the mainstream Protestant respondents. Absent a direct salience question in this dataset, it is impossible to say whether the evangelical distinction would also serve as a substitute for this direct survey measure of religiosity. Regardless, problems with its subjective nature preclude the direct saliency question from being used as a viable measure in this analysis.

Variables for being a Republican, Democrat, and Independent were also created. These variables account for the partisanship of the respondents and will make up interaction variables, along with variable accounting for religiosity. Their predicted probabilities were derived from the same method of simple cross-tabulations as used for the measures of religiosity. Another set of variables was also created to account for the ideology of respondents. Due a lack of significance among any of the variables accounting for liberals, conservatives, and moderates in a single model logistical regression including all variables, these categories were removed from the analysis. Further research will be required to show why ideology failed to gain significance similar

to that of partisanship. Both remaining sets of variables, (religiosity and partisanship), were coded as dummy variables using the same methodological precautions as noted above.

Only those respondents who definitively stated that they belonged to any of the categories were coded as such. Those respondents who said, “Don’t know”, “Neither”, or “Other” were coded along with the respondents that did not possess the attribute assessed by the respective dummy variable of interest. This was done to ensure that each respondent identified with the respective variable enough to respond definitively. Unsure responses that do not connote a clear and strong association with a particular group or identity were removed. Merely coding these respondents as “0” would cloud the final results of the regression. Rather, these respondents were coded as “System Missing.”

To effectively capture the effect partisanship has on the measures of religiosity, and vice versa, a logistical regression model was designed to produce the six interaction variable results of interest:

Republican Evangelicals	Democratic Evangelicals
Republican Protestants	Democratic Protestants
Republican Catholics	Democratic Catholics

The results from the interactions with Independents are withheld from the remainder of the analysis because they are largely peripheral to the research question at hand.

Furthermore, the predicted probabilities from each measure of religiosity interacting with the Independents mirrored those of the Democrats’. The distinctions that are significant to this analysis are those between the Democratic and Republican respondents. The

effects of constituency and party politics are important to this analysis. They are, however, lacking in the case of the Independent respondents.

The logistical regression models designed to capture the interactions above included a dummy variable for each of the religiosity and partisanship variables. They also included four of the interaction variables listed above. The interaction variables for Republican Protestants and Democratic Protestants were withheld from both models as part of the control groups. As the other control measure, the individual dummy variable values for Protestants and Catholics were each withheld from one of the two logistical regression models. These two control measures allow the results of the logistical regression models to produce predicted probabilities that accurately show values of each variable in relationship to each other.

Since each of the variables used for this analysis is a dummy variable, manipulating the values of each variable between 1 and 0 allowed for the production of a predicted probability for each of the six interaction variables. The predicted probabilities for the excluded Republican Protestants and Democratic Protestants were obtained by including only the parameters for the four individual variables that make up these interactions. The probabilities obtained through this method are coupled with the results of the cross-tabulations of the individual dummy variables to produce the results for this analysis.

Results

Table 1: Predicted Probabilities of Sympathizing with Israel.

Evangelicals	61%	Republican Evangelicals	82.9%
Protestants	43.6%	Republican Protestants	59%
Catholics	44.7%	Republican Catholics	51.6%
Republican	61.1%	Democratic Evangelicals	53.1%
Democrat	47.8%	Democratic Protestants	39.7%
Independent	44.7%	Democratic Catholics	51.4%

The results of this analysis clearly demonstrate the hypothesized effects of religiosity and partisanship. Factors inherent to an evangelical worshipper's view of the Protestant doctrine place increased importance on the existence and integrity of the State of Israel. While Israel's safety is significant for Protestant and non-Protestant worshippers, it is of particular importance to evangelical Protestants. The importance of sympathy and support for Israel within the self-proclaimed evangelical community has become increasingly explicit, as anecdotal Biblical evidence has shown. With the distinction between evangelical and non-evangelical Protestants serving as this analysis' measure of religiosity, the presence of the evangelical distinction among respondents should result in an elevated level of sympathy toward Israel.

Evangelicals in this dataset are approximately 17% more likely to be sympathetic toward Israel than mainstream Protestants. This difference between the two groups indicates that evangelicals have a 61% probability of sympathizing with Israel, regardless of partisanship. Protestants, regardless of partisanship, have approximately a 43.6% probability of sympathizing with Israel. As mainstream Protestant respondents increase their level of religiosity (i.e. respond as being evangelical) their likelihood of sympathizing with Israel increases from 43.6% to 61%. While this distinct difference is

consistent with the hypothesis, some interesting relationships do present themselves when comparing Catholics with Protestants. These relationships persist even after the interaction effects of partisanship are injected in later models.

Doctrinal characteristics inherent to the Protestant faith were hypothesized to result in a higher level of sympathy toward Israel for those worshippers. However, each model analyzed showed a lack of a significant difference between Catholics and Protestants on their likelihood of sympathizing with Israel. A superficial look at these results may cause one to conclude that the Protestant faith has no significant relationship to Israel. This lack of a significant difference also showed up in the interaction variables that addressed religion and partisanship. However, there are a couple of explanations for this inconsistency with the hypothesis. First, there are 265 Protestants and 284 Catholics. This number of Protestants does not include evangelical Protestants. Once evangelicals are removed from the Protestant population, it is logical that those who remain coded as mainstream Protestants are relatively less devout than the most devout being coded as evangelical. On the other hand, the population of Catholics in this sample has not had a group of more religious respondents extracted from it. It is this inclusion of more devout Catholics, and the exclusion of the devout evangelicals from the Protestant populations, that is creating the higher probability of Catholics sympathizing with Israel.

Secondly, this effect could be the result of the described difference between evangelicals and mainstream Protestants. Perhaps mainstream Protestants are not sensitized enough to the contents of the Protestant doctrine and the message reinforced by political parties and religious leaders. This hypothesized lack of sensitization is a result of a relatively low level of religiosity when compared to evangelical Protestants.

Furthermore, the coding of evangelicals separately from mainstream Protestants has effectively removed the most religious respondents from the dataset. This extraction of the evangelical population is also noted as a possible explanation for the lack of difference between Catholics and mainstream Protestants above. Since the remaining mainstream Protestants are hypothesized to be less devout than evangelicals who are coded separately, any phenomena related to religiosity may be difficult to detect among such a broad and heterogeneous group. Regardless, the higher probability of sympathy among Catholics, relative to Protestants, does not persist consistently when partisanship is included as an interaction variable (see Table 1).

When Republican Party membership interacts with Protestantism there is only a 7.4% higher probability of sympathizing with Israel than if one were a Catholic Republican (see Table 1). This is consistent with the hypotheses. Since Layman (1997) and others have found that more devout and orthodox worshipper tend to identify with the Republican Party, the interaction of Republicanism with Protestantism would likely be applicable to those respondents with a relatively high level of religiosity. Hence, the interaction variable is measuring the sympathy of the most devout mainstream Protestants. The inherent significance of Israel in the Protestant faith is consistent with the higher probability of sympathy for Protestant Republicans, relative to Catholic Republicans: 59% versus 51.6% probability of sympathizing with Israel, respectively.

As a result, when Republicanism interacts with Catholicism the same factors of religiosity and doctrine that were operable for the Protestant population do not apply. While more devout Catholics may tend toward the Republican Party because of domestic social issues, the issue of Israel may not be as prominent of an aspect in their faith.

Furthermore, the communalistic conflict described by Wald, Kellstedt, Legee (1993) above may draw some of the most devout and conservative Catholics to the Democratic Party. This would further reduce the effect of the interaction with partisanship when considering the prominence of Israel among those Catholics of relatively high levels of religiosity. Catholics would not register as being as sympathetic because they are not witness to the politically driven message disseminated through the Protestant or evangelical communities by the Republican Party attempting to maintain its Protestant and evangelical constituents. On the other hand, when partisanship is examined alone, Republicanism is indicative of an elevated probability of sympathy toward Israel.

As noted in Smith's *Foreign Attachments* and other pieces of literature above, both the Democratic and Republican Parties espouse comparable levels of support for Israel (Smith, p120-22). Therefore, it is not a matter of which party to which a person proscribes. Rather, it is a function of how important that party's views are to the respondent. In the context of this study, the importance of a party's views to a person is hypothesized to be a function of religiosity. As noted in the literature review and theoretical sections, religious views of relatively highly devout Evangelicals will drive them to the Republican Party (Layman, 1997). The significance of the State of Israel and pertinent domestic social issues causes respondents to adhere to party views based on the religiosity of that respondent. The same religiosity that caused evangelicals to label themselves as Republicans, because of the importance of domestic social issues, causes them to be slightly more sympathetic toward Israel. This is a result of Israel's significant role in the evangelical Protestant faith.

The effects of partisanship, alone, mirror the role of domestic social issues as theorized above. Regardless of religion or religiosity, Republicans in this dataset have a 61.1% probability of sympathizing with Israel. On the other hand, a similar Democrat has a 47.8% chance of sympathizing with Israel. In terms of domestic social issues and the importance of the State of Israel driving devout Protestants and evangelical Protestants to the Republican Party, several incentives exist for Republicanism to have an increased effect. While the support of each party for the State of Israel has been characterized as somewhat equal in degree, its manifestation and translation may logically differ. This is due to the parties' conscious evaluation of its constituency, as mentioned above.

Accordingly, evangelical Republicans should be more likely to be sympathetic toward Israel than any other group of respondents. This assertion operates on more than just the evangelical distinction alone. In addition, the position of sympathy toward Israel espoused by the Republican Party should also be of elevated importance because of the connection the party has with the evangelical worshipper. That constituency maintenance, which is initially based on domestic social issues, is also operable for the issue of sympathy toward Israel. Those evangelicals who respond as being Republican are hypothesized to be the most devout. This is because no issue central to their religious doctrine has been set aside when comparing parties with the stipulations of their religious faith. Similarly, the lack of a significant relationship between Republicanism and Evangelicalism in this dataset could be explained by a variety of factors other than economic.

Similar to the communalistic tension noted in the example of Catholicism that Wald, Kellstedt, and Legee (1993) gave, a large majority of Evangelical households in the 2002 ABC News/*Washington Post* data make less than \$75,000 a year. Most of those households bring home less than \$50,000 a year. This factor would logically draw more Evangelicals to the Democratic Party because of “bread and butter” issues related to their income and tax bracket. While such issues as income may take precedence over some domestic social issues of importance to evangelicals, this data shows that sympathy towards Israel is persistent among all evangelicals, regardless of their partisanship. There is also no statistically significant relationship between income and evangelicalism. Therefore, in relationship to other issues like income that may drive a respondent to another party, the issue of sympathy toward Israel persists at the top of the hierarchy for most evangelicals.

When considering the increased emphasis on the issue of sympathy toward Israel that the Republican Party has been theorized to show, interaction effects between religiosity and partisanship should be significant. As a respondent increases in religiosity (i.e. responds as being evangelical) the effect of Republicanism should grow, because of their receptiveness to the partisan message and the actual religious characteristics of that population. This is a result of increased prominence placed on the State of Israel by evangelicals interacting with a reinforcing message from Republican leaders trying to maintain that constituency (see Table 1).

Consistent with the theory of reinforcing factors of religion and partisanship, Evangelical Republicans show the highest level of sympathy toward Israel of any other group of respondents. Evangelical Republican respondents in this dataset have an 82.9%

probability of being sympathetic toward Israel. This is more than 23% more likely than non-evangelical Protestant Republicans, and more than 29% more likely than Evangelical Democrats to be sympathetic toward Israel. The prominence of Israel in the evangelical Protestant faith, regardless of partisanship, provides the third highest probability of sympathizing with Israel, at 61%. It is exceeded only by Republicans and Evangelical Republicans who have a 61.1% and 82.9% probability of sympathizing with Israel, respectively. The only variable that increases this already high probability is the inclusion of the Republicanism variable as an interaction effect. The persistent importance of sympathy toward the State of Israel among evangelicals causes respondents in each category of partisanship to increase their probability of sympathizing with Israel by at least a 13.4% when they respond as being evangelicals.

Several final conclusions can be drawn from these results. First, sympathy toward Israel is very near the top of the hierarchy of issues for all evangelicals, regardless of partisanship. Even for those respondents who are Democrats, sympathy toward Israel remains a clear position. It is only slightly decreased by a lack of reinforcing influence from their political party. Secondly, Republicanism reinforces the inherent importance of the State of Israel to evangelical respondents. This is due to the Republican Party's active efforts to maintain that constituency, or because other characteristics of the party draw only the more devout among Protestants. And, as shown throughout the analysis, the more devout Protestants tend to hold Israel in a more sympathetic light. Implicit in this notion is the idea that the Republican Party should have the effect of elevating levels of sympathy among more than just evangelical Protestants.

That there is an active message originating from the Republican Party focused on the issue of sympathy toward Israel and the maintenance its evangelical constituency, it is logical that the same message will have an effect on non-evangelical Protestant party members. This mechanism refers to the idea of constituency maintenance. Those members are present at the same worship ceremonies and subject to similar influences that result from any concerted and explicit party-based message. Clergy members, largely independent of active party involvement, pursue the transmission and dissemination of this politically charged message. As Wald, Kellstedt, and Legee (1993) noted, these influences are reinforced “communally”. This is evident in the distinct difference between Protestants of different parties.

Regardless, Republicanism has the expected effect of drawing or reinforcing a sympathetic view toward Israel. This is due to a party message, or the ability of the party to draw a particular worshipper. More importantly, this difference from the Democratic Party’s effect results from the evangelical constituency the Republican Party must maintain. Therefore, this analysis contends that the growing power of the evangelical constituency contains factors within itself that are inherently supportive of Israel. Furthermore, that attentive constituency has the indirect effect of helping to formulate a more sympathetic tone of the Republican Party toward Israel. This message differs from the more general rhetoric that has caused people like Smith to assert that the Democratic and Republican Parties espouse comparable levels of sympathy toward Israel (Smith, p120-122). Because of how this pro-Israel message is disseminated by political and religious leaders, other groups like Catholics and mainstream Protestants are also

influenced. This is seen in the interaction effects those groups have when combined with Republicanism.

The only single group of respondents in any model that compares with the Republicans' probability of sympathizing with Israel is the evangelicals. Since nearly half of evangelical respondents were coded as democrats, the persistent strength of the evangelical distinction regardless of partisanship must be considered. The idea of constituency maintenance by the Republican Party and, in turn, its reinforcement of that group's views has significant implications for American foreign policy. A group of constituents shaping the platform of a political party with regards to domestic policy is nothing new. However, a group of constituents acting as an interest group rarely delve into foreign policy affairs. Bard, in Wittkopf's *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy*, asserts that this is because foreign policy rarely has a direct impact on any single group of citizens. He notes that such attempts to influence party position, and thus foreign policy, are more often the goals of corporations focused around specific policy issues (Bard in Wittkopf, p92). According to these data, however, evangelicals have succeeded in becoming a vital constituency of the Republican Party. This constituency, whether based on domestic social issues or sympathy toward Israel, has also had the effect of increasing the Republican Party's level of sympathy toward Israel as it is presented to that same constituency. These groups are mutually reinforcing, and strongly sympathetic toward Israel.

Implications

Bard notes that there has been a consensus of sympathy with regard to Americans' views toward Israel. This sympathy has been in place since the 1967 War. Similarly, favorable American foreign policies have also persisted since that time (Bard in Wittkopf, p82). In an attempt to measure the actual effectiveness that interest groups have on American foreign policy, Bard analyzes AIPAC and its effects on American-Middle East relations. Given that the persistent consensus of sympathy toward Israel, and that Arab sympathy in this country has averaged 11%, it is apparent that foreign policy decision makers are operating within a set range of policy options. That range only includes options of relative preference toward Israel. Rarely, if ever, could a politician pursue a policy that is clearly unfavorable to Israel. Public opinion and electoral pressures from interest groups are commonly noted as the prohibitive factors (Bard in Wittkopf, p86).

Richard Sobel, in *The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy*, described public opinion as “a system of dikes.” This “system of dikes” is best conceived of as a range of options in a spectrum. “Dikes” border that range of acceptability. Therefore, public opinion has the ability to set limits on available policy choices within that range (Sobel, p25). In the context of Bard’s consensus of sympathy, it is logical that a politician or party could not stray too far to the edges of this accepted posture towards Israel. The basis of this consensus of sympathy and how it gets its power is the core of much of American foreign policy directed at the Middle East.

The consensus of sympathy toward Israel that exists is maintained by general public opinion and the efforts of the Israel lobby groups. American Jews and the

American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) carry out the bulk of this workload (Bard in Wittkopf, p80). While Jewish-Americans number 6 million, and reside in 12 electoral states that are alone capable of deciding the presidency, they rely on the efforts of other groups sympathetic to the State of Israel (Bard in Wittkopf, p83). Operating within this context of relative sympathy toward Israel, Bard notes that there are still a number of specific policy actions that have the potential to significantly affect inter-state relations and the balance of power in the region (Bard in Wittkopf, p84). Bard's analysis centers on the efforts of AIPAC and other pro-Israel groups' efforts to broker arms deals favorable to Israel. Throughout his analysis, however, Bard never names the sources of AIPAC's influence or the vital groups upon which it "depends." Rather, Bard seems to place evangelicals within the informal "Jewish Lobby" that includes "individuals and organizations that directly or indirectly influence American policy to support Israel" (Bard in Wittkopf, 1994, p80)

My analysis serves to highlight groups, other than Jewish Americans, that comprise much of the influence projected upon American foreign policy toward the Middle East. These mechanisms have gone further than a general public opinion consensus to sympathize with Israel through American foreign policy. Numbering more than 100 million (USA Today, 2004), evangelicals logically account for much of what Jewish Americans depend on when attempting to attain the most favorable policy outcomes for Israel. While policy makers face ramifications when they choose to oppose policies favorable to Israel or advocate policies favorable to surrounding Arab states, these ramifications do not originate solely from the Jewish American constituency (Bard in Wittkopf, p86). The active and explicit efforts of evangelical leaders to support the

efforts of Israeli leaders and pro-Israel lobbyists have been clearly noted in this analysis. These efforts will ensure that the policies directed toward the Middle East will increasingly favor Israel, regardless of a broad and general public consensus of sympathy throughout the U.S.

This predicted trend toward a relatively more favorable set of policies directed at Israel points to a paradox Bard briefly acknowledged. The United States' consensus of sympathy toward Israel has had significant effects on relations in the Middle East and the Arab world. One of the commonly known rationales for fundamentalist terrorist groups' actions is U.S. support for the State of Israel. Groups like Al Qaeda have based much of their motivation on ending this relationship (Scheuer, 2004). They intend to do this by showing the U.S. that supporting Israel brings with it costs and is not in their interest. Fatwas delivered by terrorist leaders like Ossama bin Laden have explicitly addressed this rationale (Scheuer, 2004). However distant, such threats do fall into the realm of foreign policy choices that affect the average American citizen, indirectly or not. While this indirect cause of terrorist activity is not the only catalyst, the paradox that relates to oil more directly affects American actors.

Bard briefly addresses the paradox between foreign policy toward Israel, which results in part from interest groups and public opinion, and the embittered Arab states that are often the result. The ambassador to Kuwait was quoted in 1983 as saying, "American businessmen must understand that their success in the Mideast hinges on how the U.S. deals with Israel" (Bard in Wittkopf, p92). Consequently, oil companies have felt the brunt of the consensus of sympathy that the U.S. holds for Israel. Bard notes that several oil companies have attempted to appeal purely to American national interests when siding

with Arabs on oil deals and development. While the oil industry has seen quite a bit more success than the arms industry, they remain virtually alone among U.S. economic interests that have succeeded against the interest groups and public opinion discussed here (Bard in Wittkopf, p92).

With the growing cleavage between orthodox and liberal worshippers, the power of the evangelical movement seems likely to increase. It seems logical that a trend toward policies that are in any way unfavorable to Israel is unlikely. This will be true until the two paradoxes described above become a stronger threat to U.S. national interest than the interests of Protestants and evangelical populations above. Being that politicians face repercussions if they stray from the range of acceptable policies (Bard, p86), it is evident that factors like terrorism or oil prices must reach a certain level of peril. These threats, be they oil or terrorism based, must directly affect the U.S. citizenry in a way that trumps the interests and effects that groups like the evangelical Protestants have been mobilized around. Only then will politicians be able to confidently justify diverging from the religion-based pressures exerted by groups like AIPAC and the evangelical movement.

Regardless of these pressures and ramifications that are integral to such a cost-benefit analysis, the support from the evangelical groups and political parties described here cannot accurately be measured. Their actual effectiveness, with regard to the creation of these paradoxes of American national interest, will likely go untested or unnoticed for the near future. Such factors seem too difficult to quantify, despite studies like Bard's. Short of a grave and direct threat to specific American national interests, the power, access, and influence granted to interest groups will remain unchecked. With

respect to evangelicals, this influence over AIPAC and American foreign policy toward Israel will likely grow with their population.

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
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Appendix A: Comparison and Characteristics of Religiosity Measures

Measures of Religiosity	Pros	Cons
Frequency of Attendance or Involvement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - One can argue that it is accurately measuring one's religiosity i.e. involvement. - One can argue that it is a measure of religiosity that is applicable across denominations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Does not always measure devotional nature of religiosity. Rather, it may merely be measuring one's habit, or tradition, of attendance i.e. "Going through the motions." - Gives undue weight to religious traditions that stipulate mid-week worship attendance i.e. evangelicals.
Saliency Question	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - One can argue that it is a measure of religiosity that is applicable across denominations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Is highly subjective, and does not provide a viable measure of religiosity across respondents.
Orthodoxy of Worship	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provides a measure of one's religiosity based on adherence and is inherently in comparison to those respondents who do not code as being orthodox. - Is not subjective, and operates on a nominal distinction rather than one's own valuation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - This distinction cannot be applied across denominations. It is most effectively applied to the Jewish faith. Within the Protestant denominations, the evangelical distinction effectively differentiates 'orthodox' respondents from mainline Protestants along lines of adherence.

Appendix B: Similarity in Salience Across Traditions of Attendance

Possible coding of respondents with respect to salience and frequency of attendance survey questions.



Appendix C: Independent Variable Coding

Religiosity:

Catholic	1-Presence
	0-Absence
Protestant	1-Presence
	0-Absence
Evangelical	1-Presence
Protestant	0-Absence

Partisanship:

Democrat	1-Presence
	0-Absence
Independent	1-Presence
	0-Absence
Republican	1-Presence
	0-Absence

Ideology:

Liberal	1-Presence
	0-Absence
Moderate	1-Presence
	0-Absence
Conservative	1-Presence
	0-Absence

Only those respondents who clearly definitively stated that they possessed the respective attribute are coded with a “1”. Only those respondents who clearly and definitively stated they did not possess the respective attribute were coded as “0”. Those who responded “Don’t know”, “Neither”, or “Other” were coded as “System Missing” in order to gain a clearer picture of the effects of the presence of the specific attribute.

Inclusion of respondents who do not cleanly fit into the categories outlined by the respective variable will not accurately represent the hypothesized effect of that variable, if it indeed exists.

Finally, only those respondents who were classified as Protestant could be categorized as evangelical Protestants. This precaution prevented non-Protestants, Muslims, Jews, and Atheists from responding in the affirmative when questioned about their evangelical status. This has the effect of preserving the distinction between Protestants and evangelicals that operates along a gradient of religiosity. When juxtaposed in this manner, the evangelical distinction most accurately serves as a measure of religiosity.

Appendix E: Exclusion of Ideology Variables

Model 1.

	B	Significance
Protestant	-.179	.319
Evangelical	.612	.000
Republican	.722	.000
Independent	-.035	.842
Liberal	.018	.934
Moderate	.265	.116
Constant	-.364	.072

Model 2.

	B	Significance
Evangelical	.661	.000
Catholic	-.044	.799
Republican	.760	.000
Democrat	.038	.828
Liberal	-.238	.224
Conservative	-.249	.138
Constant	-.191	.263

As noted in the analysis, the variables created for ideology failed to obtain any statistically significant difference. This could be the result of survey structure or wording. Regardless, it appears as though the respondents in this dataset did not make the traditional connections between partisanship and ideology. These variables were subsequently removed from the logistical regression models.

Appendix F: Logistical Regression Models

Model 1	Parameter	Sig	Model 2	Parameter	Sig
Protestant	-0.163	.449	Protestant	0	
Evangelical	0.385	.163	Evangelical	0.322	.280
Catholic	0.00E+00		Catholic	-2.63E-01	.365
Republican	0.773	.008	Republican	0.515	.070
Independent	0.086	.747	Independent	0	
Democrat	0		Democrat	-0.266	.367
Repub&Evang	0.722	.103	Repub&Evang	0.894	.053
Evang&Dem	0.04	.919	Evang&Dem	0.22	.594
Repub&Cath	-0.405	.218	Repub&Cath	-0.034	.936
Dem&Cath	0.356	.305	Dem&Cath	0.736	.083
Constant	-0.3	.255	Constant	-0.151	.457

This table presents the values and parameters for both models. They are shown in the exact form as used to calculate predicted probabilities in the Microsoft Excel program. Note the exclusion of the individual and interaction control variables, as well as the ideology variables.

Vita

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